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Abstract: Legal and regulatory requirements governing
transfers of potentially sensitive or private data about
individuals are complex and often not very well under-
stood by researchers managing human subjects data.
Because there is no common set of licensing agree-
ments that is shared across institutions and laws, cur-
rent methods to create data use agreements typically
require significant efforts by legal counsel for each data
transfer. As a result, different institutions duplicate ef-
fort in developing variations of agreements for identical
uses, and the licenses produced are often too generic
and fail to accurately capture either the necessary re-
strictions on data use or the necessary protections. In
this paper, we summarize work-in-progress on expert
system support to automate some data deposit and re-
lease decisions within a data repository, and to gener-
ate custom license agreements for those data transfers.
Our approach formalizes via a logic programming lan-
guage the privacy-relevant aspects of laws, regulations,
and best practices, supported by legal analysis docu-
mented in legal memoranda. This formalization enables
automated reasoning about the conditions under which
a repository can transfer data, through interrogation of
users, and the application of formal rules to the facts ob-
tained from users. The proposed system takes the spe-
cific conditions for a given data release and produces a
custom data use agreement that accurately captures the
relevant restrictions on data use. This enables appropri-
ate decisions and accurate licenses, while removing the
bottleneck of lawyer effort per data transfer. The op-
eration of the system aims to be transparent, in the
sense that administrators, lawyers, institutional review
boards, and other interested parties can evaluate the
legal reasoning and interpretation embodied in the for-
malization, and the specific rationale for a decision to
accept or release a particular dataset.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation: Sharing Sensitive Data
Governed by Privacy Laws
Making data widely available supports the replication
of research results, increases access to public resources,
leverages investments in generating research data, and
advances research and innovation [8, 18]. Moreover,
funding agencies often require that data be made openly
available where possible (e.g., [25, 26]), and many schol-
arly journals expect or mandate the sharing of data
along with publication [28]. However, a major challenge
for disseminating data is protecting the privacy of hu-
man subjects [11–14]. A complex array of laws, policies,
and agreements restrict how data containing personal
information may be collected, analyzed, and shared in
different contexts.
Privacy laws are highly sector- and context-specific,
and contracts for sharing different types of information
in different jurisdictions vary significantly. For example,
a researcher who conducts a study of human subjects
must consider whether the Common Rule (45 C.F.R.
part 46) requires approval from an institutional review
board and delineates the procedure for obtaining in-
formed consent from subjects. A researcher may also be
required to determine whether sharing of the data is
governed by the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (45 C.F.R. part
160 and subparts A and E of part 164), which regulates
the sharing of data containing protected health informa-
tion held by covered entities, or the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. § 1232g), which regu-
lates the sharing of records held by educational agencies
and institutions that directly relate to a student.
Determining which provisions of the various privacy
laws in place govern a given data transfer, and how their
requirements should be reflected in a data use agree-
ment, can require a complex legal analysis. The com-
plexity increases when multiple laws, such as a federal
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privacy law and a state data security law, as well as
multiple institutional policies, may be applicable. Such
determinations require a thorough analysis of the le-
gal definitions used, the categories of data and enti-
ties covered, and the interpretations of these terms by
the courts, agencies, and other institutions. In addition,
data are often collected or shared under binding data
sharing agreements or institutional policies. Researchers
and institutions that manage and share data related to
individuals are required to understand whether any of
these regulatory and contractual restrictions apply to an
individual dataset and, if so, how such restrictions affect
the handling of the dataset throughout its lifecycle.
Our approach renders the challenges of automating
data sharing decisions constrained by complex regula-
tory requirements are made tractable by limiting the
domain of potential action in two key ways: (1) through
a selection of use cases and (2) a specification of con-
ditions under which actions are permitted or denied,
within the scope of the use cases identified.
First, the scope of analysis is limited to a specific
domain of use cases, actors, and actions. In developing
our system, we chose to focus on the data sharing deci-
sions made by a research data repository as our initial
use case.
By focusing on a relatively narrow scope of action,
this approach aims to overcome many of the challenges
associated with formalizing legal requirements. Such
challenges include the need to account for ambiguity
and flexibility in interpretation, the broad applicabil-
ity of regulatory requirements, the relevance of multiple
laws and policies to a given setting, and variations in
practices and policies for complying with legal require-
ments across institutions.
Second, the scope of analysis in this formalization is
also limited to a subset of conditions that can be auto-
matically permitted or denied. The formalization aims
to model only the set of conditions under which actions
are clearly permitted or denied. In less clear cases, where
automation is not feasible or desirable, the system sup-
ports the possibility of escalation to human review.
1.2 An Illustration: Sharing Educational
Data for Research
Consider a scenario in which a professor at a research
university is a principal investigator (PI) leading a ten-
year longitudinal education study funded by her uni-
versity and a private foundation. The research subjects
are public school students in grades 6–12. Their parents
received notice of the study and provided written con-
sent for their children’s participation. The dataset from
the study contains grades collected pursuant to tran-
script requests to the school (with authorization from
the students’ parents), and responses to questionnaires
distributed to the students. Some identifiable informa-
tion such as names and addresses have been removed,
but other information such as gender, race, and ZIP
code remain.
At the end of the study, the PI wishes to make
the dataset available to other researchers for replica-
tion and secondary research uses, as required by the
policy of the private foundation that funded the study.
She is aware that the sensitive data from this study
is likely protected by laws such as FERPA, but she is
not very familiar with specific legal requirements, such
as the steps that must be taken to de-identify data in
accordance with FERPA, or who the data may be per-
missibly shared with and under what license terms. Fur-
thermore, she does not have the resources to vet indi-
vidual requests for the data nor apply state-of-the-art
de-identification techniques to the data. She wishes to
transfer the dataset—and these responsibilities—to a
research data repository. She would also like to do so in a
way that demonstrates accountability to key stakehold-
ers, including her university’s and future researchers’
institutional review boards.
She chooses a data repository housed at another re-
search university that serves a worldwide community
of researchers from a wide range of disciplines. The
repository, in turn, aims to facilitate data access and
provide persistence for research data, while managing
legal and ethical risks related to the long-term stor-
age of personal data about research subjects. However,
the repository also has concerns about accepting per-
sonal data that would create new responsibilities for the
repository under the law, including the imposition of
new administrative, physical, and technical safeguards
and audit and retention requirements. The repository
is also concerned about accountability to the depositing
researcher’s home institution for the legal risks it as-
sumes, and about following best practices for exposing
research subjects to data privacy risks when storing and
transferring data about them.
It is a persistent challenge to ensure that each of
the stakeholders involved—including the research sub-
jects, the researchers who collected data about them,
the researchers who will use the data, the researchers’
home institutions, their institutional review boards, the
data repository, funders, and journals—understand the
legal restrictions and best practices that apply to the
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data, and to demonstrate that such restrictions and best
practices are being followed to protect the privacy of the
individuals in the data.
1.3 Our Approach
Our approach aims to make it easier for data producers,
users, and publishers to store, use, and transfer sensitive
personal information in a standardized and responsible
way. We focus on research data repositories, which en-
ables us to understand the challenges and benefits of
implementing an automated solution, and the activities
and concerns of research data repositories are shared
by other institutions, such as government agencies and
commercial firms. (See [1, 2] for an introduction to the
laws and risks related to storing and releasing personal
data in the corporate, research, and government sec-
tors.)
We aim to create legal instruments that consistently
apply privacy protections across the information lifecy-
cle (from collection to storage to use to release), are
modular and machine-actionable, and are tailored to the
specific needs of researchers, institutional adopters (e.g.,
institutional review boards, university offices of spon-
sored programs, repository owners), and research sub-
jects, for the purposes of ensuring privacy, security, con-
sent, and accountability, and for meeting legal require-
ments and the users’ goals for analysis of the data. To
this end, this effort brings together expertise from com-
puter science (formal policy design), law, social science
(survey design), and information science (taxonomies).
In our system, we encode the relevant provisions of
domains (e.g., laws, policies, contracts, and best prac-
tices) as logic programs that can determine which re-
strictions are appropriate for a given dataset. Domains
may be defined by legislation, regulation, case-law, or
practice. They are defined by humans and human insti-
tutions, and thus the boundaries are inherently fuzzy.
We rely on legal experts to define the boundaries of each
domain by identifying the set of documents (legislative
code, commentary, institutional policies, etc.) that must
be understood to act correctly within that domain.
We then use automated interviews to elicit from
users relevant information (such as properties of a
dataset). Using these facts and the logic program, we
can determine appropriate data handling policies and
generate custom license agreements.
The creation of the logic program, interview ques-
tions, and license terms, process is given structure by
the application of methodology from law, information
science, and computer science. This process, outlined in
Table 1 involves two stages. In the first stage, we con-
duct use-case analysis of the data curation lifecycle to
identify the scenarios in which the repository interacts
with other actors over data. In the second stage, we con-
duct a legal domain analysis, which aims to characterize
the restrictions that specified legal domain places over
the scenarios identified in the use case analysis.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we describe the workflow of a research data
repository and how that workflow must account for re-
strictions from various domains. In Section 3 we describe
our system, and illustrate how we encode the relevant
provisions of a domain as a logic program, and how we
use the logic program and facts provided by the user to
help automate the workflow of a data repository. We de-
scribe in Section 4 the methodology by which we formal-
ize the relevant aspects of a domain, including develop-
ment of legal memoranda based on use cases relevant to
the domain, development of logic rules that capture the
restrictions identified by the memoranda, and drafting
of relevant license terms to be included in automatically
generated license agreements. Section 5 illustrates this
formalization process for FERPA. We discuss domain
composition in Section 6 and possible extensions to our
system in Section 7. Section 8 describes related work.
2 Automating Repository Actions
The system we propose is designed to be integrated into
a data repository workflow. This workflow can be con-
ceptualized as having distinct stages, including deposit,
acceptance, transformation, retention, and dissemina-
tion. In this section, we describe how actions at each of
these stages (such as deposit, accept, transform, and re-
lease) can be automated using formal rules and license
terms. In Section 3 we describe our system, which is
designed to support the workflow we describe here.
2.1 Deposit
When a user, such as the PI from the hypothetical
above, initiates deposit of a dataset through a repos-
itory’s web interface, she will first encounter an inter-
view. The interview presents the user with a series of
questions that are designed to elicit facts about the
dataset, the personal information it contains, the indi-
viduals in the data, the researchers and institutions that
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1. Use Case Analysis: A. De-
fine Cases in Scope
a. Data Deposit
b. Retention
c. Transformation
d. Dissemination
2. Use Case Analysis: B. Parse
Components
a. Actors: Data Controller,
Repository, Data Deposi-
tor, Data User, Data Sub-
ject
b. Actions: Deposit, Accept,
Store, Release, Analyze
c. Objects: Data set, Record,
Consent Form, DUA
2. Domain Analysis B. Le-
gal Characterization
a. Identify Relevant
Documentation
b. Characterize Restric-
tions on Use Cases
c. Characterize Restric-
tions on Actors, Ac-
tions, Entities
d. Develop legal memo-
randum
2. Domain Analysis: B. Coding
Actions and Conditions
a. Map rules permitting and
restricting action to law-
specific characteristics
b. Map law-specific character-
istics to license text and af-
firmations
c. Map law-specific character-
istics to general properties
Table 1. Overview of the stages of the formalization process.
participated in the data collection and subsequent data
transfers, and any privacy-related transformations that
have been applied to the dataset, among many other re-
lated characteristics of the dataset and actors involved.
The questions are written to be understandable by a
lay user who has neither legal or technical expertise nor
familiarity with terminology in this area. Questions are
written in plain language, with minimal use of terms of
art and are accompanied by detailed definitions, non-
technical explanations, and real-world examples.
The interview questions are designed to determine
which laws and best practices are applicable to the in-
formation in the dataset. For example, returning to the
hypothetical above, the interview will ask questions to
determine whether FERPA applies to the dataset. One
such question is designed to elicit a fact about the prove-
nance of the dataset, specifically whether any informa-
tion in the dataset originated from records maintained
by an educational agency or institution, as defined by
FERPA. In the Appendix (Figure 5), we show (a) a
plainly-worded question, tailored to non-experts acting
within research data transfer use cases, that was con-
structed based on (b) language from the FERPA regu-
lations that is likely to be unfamiliar and difficult for a
non-expert to parse.
A depositor uses what she knows about the at-
tributes of a particular dataset and the relevant actors
to provide responses to the questions presented by the
repository. Based on the depositor’s answers, the repos-
itory is able to conduct an analysis. This analysis iden-
tifies the key conditions that likely apply to the data
and imply legal and best practice requirements. For ex-
ample, an affirmative response to the sample question
in Figure 5, in combination with affirmative answers to
other FERPA-related questions, would likely imply that
conditions required by FERPA apply and constrain ac-
tions on the data.
When the choice of license relies on a particular legal
fact that is supplied by the depositor, it is best practice
to have that fact affirmed directly in the license agree-
ment. This can be accomplished in one of two ways – by
ensuring that the license conditions for that use case re-
quire a separate affirmation license term, or by including
the question and the user response verbatim. We refer
to questions that are used to directly affirm legal facts
as affirmations – and the license template is used to au-
tomatically insert any active affirmations into the final
license.
For example in this case, our license must include
an affirmation that The deposit process will also require
the depositor to affirm the truth of the facts that were
inferred to be true on the basis of her responses to the
questions. These facts are presented to the user as affir-
mations, such as “I affirm that the data contain informa-
tion derived from records maintained by an educational
agency or institution that receives funds from the US
Department of Education,” and the users must confirm
their applicability. Depending on the conditions that are
identified and confirmed by the user, one of three out-
comes will occur: (1) deposit of the dataset will be per-
mitted, and data deposit and sharing licenses will be
automatically generated based on the conditions that
are required, (2) the dataset will be flagged for human
review, or (3) the deposit request will be rejected.
2.2 Acceptance
Upon determining that the user is permitted to deposit
the dataset and the repository is permitted to accept
it, the repository will present the user with a bundle of
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licenses and related documentation. This bundle con-
tains a complete license for deposit, using standardized
terms, that establishes a contract between the depositor
and the repository.1
The bundle also includes a list of affirmations con-
firming the key conditions identified as applying to the
data, as well as provenance documentation, which pro-
vides a record tracing the interview responses to the
conditions and the conditions to the terms included in
the license. The repository also shares documentation of
its compliance with the laws identified as relevant. The
principal investigator can, in turn, hand over the license
and documentation for review by her home university’s
institutional review board, office of sponsored programs,
or general counsel’s office. This enhances accountability,
as the process of producing and recording this documen-
tation creates evidence of the parties’ compliance with
legal obligations and demonstrates their trustworthi-
ness. Upon review and approval by the relevant offices at
her home institution, the principal investigator can re-
turn to the repository, agree to the license, and deposit
the data. At this time, human-readable and machine-
actionable metadata reflecting the applicable require-
ments are then associated with the deposited dataset.
These metadata are generated by the logical reasoning
system described above, encompassing the permissible
actions that may be taken with respect to the dataset
and under what conditions and representing a data han-
dling policy that is custom to the dataset.
2.3 Retention
Throughout the repository’s long-term retention of the
dataset, these metadata serve as the basis for making
automated decisions regarding how the dataset will be
stored, encompassing the steps the repository must take
to comply with various data security, retention, destruc-
tion, and breach-reporting requirements in accordance
with applicable laws and best practice. Documenting
these requirements as metadata that will follow the
dataset throughout its lifecycle enables the repository to
make representations to the depositor that the dataset
1 One may note that Deposit, Acceptance, and Dissemination
could be further decomposed into transmission and receiving ac-
tions. Deposit/acceptance can be stated as the depositor trans-
mitting a dataset to a repository, which receives it. And dissemi-
nation could be stated as the repository transmitting the dataset
to a third party. We choose to use the higher-level semantic, as
it reduces the complexity of rules.
will be handled appropriately over the long term, and
ensures accountability for each of the parties involved.
2.4 Release and Transformation
Based on release conditions that apply and are recorded
in the metadata, the repository will be able to automate
some of its decisions to release the dataset to users for
secondary research purposes. For example, the meta-
data may reflect that the dataset can be transferred
under an automatically generated license to any user,
or only to certain, vetted users. In other cases, where it
is not appropriate to automatically make the deposited
dataset available for download, the repository may in-
stead allow access to the data through a protected anal-
ysis mechanism (e.g., [17]), or to a version of the dataset
that has been produced by applying privacy-preserving
transformations.
3 System Design
Figure 1 presents an overview of our system design.
There are two key components: (1) a formalization of
relevant aspects of domains and (2) an automated li-
cense generator.
We use a logic programming language (currently,
Prolog) to formalize privacy-relevant domains, which
enables us to state rules declaratively. Monotonicity of
the logic facilitates modularity and compositionality.
Also, logic programming enables us to use the formal-
izations in different modes, for example, to determine
whether a given action is permitted or denied for a
dataset, or to search for conditions under which a given
action would be denied.
3.1 Actions and Permissions
The key concepts in the formalization are ac-
tions and permissions. Actions include the deposit
of a dataset in a repository and the release of a
dataset to a data user. These two actions are repre-
sented respectively by deposit(DD, DS, R, CS) and
release(R, DS, DU, DD, CS), where DD represents the
data depositor, DS the data set, R the repository, DU
the data user, and CS a set of licenses and other condi-
tions that restrict an action. The domain might indicate
whether an action is permitted or denied. For example,
permitted(ferpa, release(R, DS, DU, DD, CS))
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Fig. 1. Conceptual system diagram.
permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU ,
_DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
\+( ferpa_identifiable(DS)).
Fig. 2. Sample FERPA rule permitting release of a dataset that
does not contain identifiable information. The parameter N and
predicate bounded(CS, N) are used to ensure that search for
conditions CS is bounded.
represents that (our formalization of) the FERPA legis-
lation permits the action release(R, DS, DU, DD, CS).
Similarly, denied(ferpa, A) represents that FERPA
legislation denies action A. A given domain may neither
permit nor deny a given action, if, for example, the
dataset does not fall under the scope of the domain.
We model domains with inference rules in the logic
programming language. Each domain that we model is
modularly expressed by its own set of inference rules,
following the modeling process described below in Sec-
tion 4. In this paper, we provide sample rules used to
model FERPA. The rules describe the conditions un-
der which FERPA permits the release of a dataset that
is in the scope of FERPA (i.e., contains information
about educational records of a US educational agency
or institution). For example, Figure 2 provides a sample
FERPA rule permitting the release of a dataset if it does
not contain identifiable information, where “identifiable
information” is defined by FERPA. Figure 3 provides
another FERPA rule permitting release if the dataset
is released under an exception for research studies or
auditing.2
3.2 Modeling Release Rules
Let’s consider one of the rules in more detail: the
rule for release under the studies exception or the
audit exception to FERPA, as provided in Figure 3.
The rule states that FERPA permits a release of
dataset DS under conditions CS if the dataset is in the
scope of the FERPA legislation (ferpa_datasetInScope
(DS)), the dataset contains identifiable information
2 There are several other conditions under which FERPA per-
mits release – including for specific consented purposes. For an
exhaustive list, see the online appendix.
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permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU ,
_DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
ferpa_identifiable(DS),
(ferpa_studiesException(DS);
ferpa_auditException(DS)),
(ferpa_license_studiesException(CS);
ferpa_license_auditException(CS)).
Fig. 3. Sample FERPA rule for studies exception and audit excep-
tion.
as defined by FERPA (ferpa_identifiable(DS)), the
dataset is shared under either the studies excep-
tion or the audit exception (ferpa_studiesException
(DS); ferpa_auditException(DS), where ; indicates
disjunction in Prolog), and the dataset is re-
leased either with a license that satisfies the stud-
ies exception or a license that satisfies the au-
dit exception (ferpa_license_studiesException(CS);
ferpa_license_auditException(CS)). Note that the
rule deliberately permits the dataset to be, for exam-
ple, shared initially under the audit exception, but re-
disclosed under either the studies or audit exception.
This is a result of the legal analysis (Section 5.1), which
permits disclosure under either exception regardless of
how the data was originally shared.
Some predicates used in these rules are them-
selves defined by additional rules. For example,
predicate ferpa_license_studiesException(CS) (de-
fined in Figure 6, in the Appendix) holds if con-
ditions CS contain licenses that satisfy a num-
ber of requirements, including that the license
lists the duration of the study for which the
data is being released (conditionsRequire(CS,
ferpa_license_duration)), and that the license con-
tains terms related to the destruction of data upon
the completion of the study (conditionsRequire(CS,
general_license_dataDestruction)).
Other predicates represent facts about the world
that cannot be inferred by our formalization, such
as whether a dataset contains identifiable information
(e.g., the predicate ferpa_identifiable(DS) indicates
that dataset DS contains identifiable information, as de-
fined by the FERPA legislation). These facts must be
provided by a user familiar with the dataset, via the au-
tomated interview with the data depositor. We express
this in our system design diagram (Figure 1) by the in-
teraction between the data depositor and our system.
Using a logic program to express the formaliza-
tion of privacy-relevant aspects of domains enables us
to explore privacy requirements in various ways. Most
straightforward is to provide facts regarding a specific
dataset, and then to use the logic program to answer
which actions on that dataset are permitted and de-
nied by various domains. These permitted and denied
actions can form the basis for how the data repository
chooses to handle the dataset, in terms of access control
decisions and encryption on data at rest and in transit,
among other choices.
Our logic program formalization can also be used
to search for conditions under which (our formalization
of) a domain is contradictory (i.e., there exists a dataset
and an action on the dataset such that the domain both
permits and denies that action) and for conditions under
which the domain is silent (i.e., there exists a dataset
and an action that should be in the domain’s scope, but
the domain neither permits nor denies that action).
3.3 Modeling Transformations
Our system can also express rules that capture rea-
soning about transformations of datasets, and how
those transformations interact with a domain’s privacy-
relevant requirements. In general terms, we use trans-
formation to describe the output yielded by a particu-
lar set of computations applied to a dataset. How data
are transformed often affects whether data are permit-
ted to be stored or released. Many laws explicitly refer
to transformations such as redaction, de-identification
or anonymization, and encryption. Formally, we reason
over transformation through encoding that:
1. A dataset derives from another dataset;
2. The derivation occurs through the use of a tool, with
a given set of parameters;
3. The repository owner affirms that the tool satisfies
a transformation condition; and
4. Some action is permitted on an output based on the
transformation condition.
Returning to the example of FERPA, consider that
FERPA permits the release of de-identified information.
There may be different transformations under which a
dataset would be permitted to be released by FERPA.
Because the text of FERPA and related interpretive
guidance does not provide a single technique or list of
techniques that is deemed to be sufficient to meet the de-
identification standard, such a transformation condition
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ferpaSufficientEps (0.1).
permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU ,
_DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
derivedFrom(DS, DS2 ,
differentialPrivacy(Params)),
member ([ totalBudget , EPS], Params),
ferpaSufficientEps(FE),
EPS <= FE.
Fig. 4. Sample best practice rule permitting the release of a
FERPA-protected dataset that has been transformed using dif-
ferential privacy.
does not come from the formalization of the law itself.
Rather, the transformation condition may come from an
institutional policy or best practice guideline. For ex-
ample, some organizations may use aggregation or sup-
pression techniques to meet FERPA’s de-identification
requirements as an institutional policy. Other organi-
zations may choose to rely on best practice guidelines
regarding state of the art techniques for protecting pri-
vacy. For instance, experts have demonstrated that the
use of differential privacy (with a reasonable value for
the privacy parameter epsilon) is sufficient to satisfy
FERPA’s de-identification requirements [23].
To illustrate this, consider a rule permitting the
release of FERPA-protected data that has been trans-
formed using differential privacy, shown in Figure 4. The
rule states that FERPA permits the release of a dataset
that is in the regulation’s scope, if the dataset is derived
from a dataset DS2 using a differentially private trans-
formation where the total information release budget
(i.e., over all data releases) is considered to be sufficient
to meet the deidentification standard of FERPA.3 Fur-
ther rules for accepting and depositing data transformed
using differential privacy can be similarly formalized.
Determining that dataset DS is derived from dataset
DS2 with parameters Paramsmay require interview ques-
tions and affirmations from the user. Alternatively, and
more flexibly, a repository that provides the ability to
3 This sample rule takes 0.1 to be a reasonable value of the pri-
vacy budget parameter epsilon and therefore sufficient to meet
the de-identification standard of FERPA, in accordance with re-
cent best practice guidelines [24]. Note: the repository needs to
be aware of the total budget consumed over all releases, not just
the budget consumed to derive dataset DS from dataset DS2.
transform datasets could provide these facts. For exam-
ple, a repository could use a differential privacy tool,
such as PSI [17], to transform the data and provide our
system with appropriate facts about how one dataset
was derived from another using this tool. This can sup-
port not only the creation of public-use output from
protected data, but could be used to enable the auto-
mated use of transformation tools to enable deposit or
release of otherwise protected data.
3.4 Modeling Purpose Restrictions
Most domains impose restrictions on data that are con-
ditioned on the purpose of the data controller’s or data
user’s use of the data. For example, FERPA permits
non-directory personally identifiable information to be
used for any purpose to which the data subject has
specifically consented; further, such information can be
used without consent for certain purposes (and by cer-
tain entities). Under the FERPA studies exception, con-
sent is not required for research studies conducted by
certain parties that have the purpose of developing, val-
idating, or administering predictive tests; administering
student aid programs; or improving instruction.4
Generally, purpose restrictions such as these can be
modeled in three (non-exclusive) ways: as an indepen-
dent condition; as an opaque text statement; or as a
set of permitted and denied component purposes drawn
from a common taxonomy.
First, where a specific set of purposes is defined by
the domain itself, we may model that term as a unique
condition. This approach is most appropriate when the
meaning or language associated with that purpose is
idiosyncratic to that domain, or is inextricably com-
bined with other simultaneous conditions. For example,
we model the studies exception above using the dataset
predicate ferpa_studiesException(DS), and create a
corresponding license term that satisfies the predicate.
This is because the definition of a study is specific to
FERPA, and because this restriction on purpose is never
used independently of the other restrictions documented
in the studies exception.
Second, where a purpose restriction is defined not
by the law but by the data subject or data depositor,
statements of permitted purposes and denied purposes
are recorded when the data set is ingested. Release can
then be permitted under the condition that the recipient
4 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(6).
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agrees to the terms supplied. This restriction is reflected
in the condition set for a release action in our formal-
ization and realized as a specific license term added to
the automatically-generated agreement.
Last, where purpose restrictions are generalizable
we define them in terms of formal taxonomies. Although
the details of taxonomy selection are beyond the scope
of this work, we illustrate the purpose restrictions using
the EuroVoc Thesaurus [27], which is a officially created,
multi-lingual, formally defined (based on ISO-5964 and
ISO-2788) thesaurus which describes human activities
subject to EU regulation.
Using this taxonomy we can characterize both pur-
pose categories that are always permitted and purpose
categories that are always denied for a given dataset.
This can allow automation of some decisions about
whether a particular purpose is suitable for a given
dataset. However, since the taxonomic categories are of-
ten broader than domain-defined or user-supplied con-
ditions, some decisions will require human review based
on the specific purposes text supplied (e.g. in the con-
sent agreement under which data is deposited.)
For example, a group of subjects might consent
to their identifiable data being used for education re-
search, or for medical research specific to schizophre-
nia. Since the EuroVoc taxonomy does not does not
specify schizophrenia but includes the category of men-
tal health, at the time of ingestion, a human-readable
purpose statement could be “Must be used for the
purposes of research in education or on schizophre-
nia only”, the always-permitted purpose category
be 3206.Education AND 2194.Research, the always-
denied purpose category be NOT ((2194.Research) OR
NOT (3206.Education OR 5878.Mental Health), and
human review is required for medical research purposes
in order to determine whether they are for research on
schizophrenia.
3.5 Automated License Generation
A key component of our system is automated license
generation. Various kinds of licenses are needed during
the lifecycle of data in a data repository. For instance,
a deposit license between the repository and the data
depositor at the time a dataset is submitted to a repos-
itory, and a data use agreement between the repository
and a data user is needed when a dataset is released to
the data user. These licenses may be required by leg-
islation, best practices, or repository policy to contain
certain information or text. We use output of the logic
program formalization to determine whether these li-
cense requirements apply to a given action on a dataset.
Based on the license requirements, we select snippets of
license terms to include in the license. For each domain
we formalize, these snippets form part of the formaliza-
tion, containing text and the conditions under which to
include the text in a license. For illustration, an example
of such a formalization for FERPA is presented below in
Section 5.3. We use a license template (which contains
placeholders indicating where to include the appropriate
snippets of license text) and some mild text processing
(e.g., formatting, and connectives for terms) to produce
an appropriate license.
4 Formalizing Privacy Law
Domains for Data Controllers
4.1 Constraining the Scope of Action
The domain formalization process begins with referring
back to the specific use cases that are within the scope
of research data sharing. From there, the analysis pro-
ceeds by identifying the relevant legal documentation
and requirements that apply to the scope of actions cir-
cumscribed by those use cases.
Taking the data deposit use case for instance, there
are implied actors (e.g., the data depositor and the data
repository), actions (e.g., the data depositor’s deposit
of the data set and the data repository’s acceptance of
the data set), objects (e.g., the data set and the records
contained in the data set), and properties (e.g., the data
set contains records within the scope of FERPA).
4.2 Analyzing Legal Restrictions
Applicable to Use Cases
The formalization is supported by detailed legal memo-
randa analyzing individual laws, institutional and con-
tractual approaches to data sharing, and the relevant
academic literature. To develop these memoranda, legal
research is conducted to identify specific restrictions on
use cases, actors, actions, and objects relevant to under-
standing the applicability of these regulations, policies,
and contracts to researchers and data repositories. This
involves, for example, analyzing federal and state reg-
ulations that restrict the access, use, and disclosure of
sensitive data and the applicability of these regulations
to researchers and data repositories. It also involves an-
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alyzing individual university data classification policies,
institutional review board policies, and the academic lit-
erature to identify definitions, interpretations, and prac-
tices for implementing requirements of data privacy laws
in research settings.
For each law analyzed, the output is a legal memo-
randum that summarizes research and analysis to apply
the law to a set of facts based on the identified scope
of action. This analysis seeks to determine which provi-
sions of a specific law apply to the relevant researcher
and research data repository use cases, to identify the
conditions under which these provisions are applicable,
and to identify the restrictions that must be imposed in
cases in which such conditions are applicable.
4.3 Expert Coding
The aforementioned legal memoranda serve as the basis
for the formalization process. The formalization relies
on expert coding to translate requirements from law,
as expressed in the legal memoranda, together with re-
quirements from policy and best practice, into formal
rules, conditions, license terms, and affirmations. This
process involves multiple steps:
1. Identification of a key legal requirement, policy re-
quirement, best practice, or common practice,
2. Identification of the key dataset or data controller
properties relevant to determining whether the legal
requirements or practices apply to a given dataset,
3. Mapping rules permitting and restricting action to
law-specific characteristics,
4. Mapping law-specific characteristics to general
properties,
5. Construction of rules that link properties to actions,
6. Mapping law-specific characteristics to license text
(including affirmations),
7. Construction of questions (in addition to affirma-
tions) to elicit properties from data controllers,
8. Construction of rules linking question responses to
properties, and
9. Construction of rules linking properties to permit-
ted and denied actions under appropriate license
conditions.
In the next section we illustrate the key points of
the coding process using a concrete example.
5 Illustration: Formalizing FERPA
To illustrate the formalization process, we detail the
steps involved in our formalization of a selected law, the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).5
Based on an analysis of a corpus of research data repos-
itory policies, FERPA was identified as a key regulatory
requirement in the context of the research data repos-
itory use cases identified. FERPA protects personally
identifiable information from education records main-
tained by educational agencies and institutions that re-
ceive funding from the U.S. Department of Education.6
Under FERPA, non-directory personally identifiable in-
formation7 from education records generally cannot be
disclosed by an educational agency or institution with-
out consent, unless an exception to the FERPA consent
requirement applies.
5.1 Analyzing the Use Case
Legal research and analysis summarized in the FERPA
memorandum identified a number of ways in which per-
sonally identifiable information (PII) from education
records protected by FERPA could be shared via a re-
search data repository. Specifically, any of the following
conditions, if applicable, could permit such a transfer:
– Disclosure with consent. FERPA permits the
disclosure of PII with the consent of a student over
the age of 18 (or the student’s parent, if the student
is under the age of 18). The consent must be in writ-
ing, signed, and dated, and it must specify (1) the
records that may be disclosed; (2) the purpose of
5 (20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99).
6 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A)).
7 FERPA defines personally identifiable information as follows:
“The term includes, but is not limited to– (a) The student’s
name; (b) The name of the student’s parent or other family
members; (c) The address of the student or student’s family;
(d) A personal identifier, such as the student’s social security
number, student number, or biometric record; (e) Other indi-
rect identifiers, such as the student’s date of birth, place of birth,
and mother’s maiden name; (f) Other information that, alone or
in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific student that
would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who
does not have personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances,
to identify the student with reasonable certainty; or (g) Infor-
mation requested by a person who the educational agency or
institution reasonably believes knows the identity of the student
to whom the education record relates. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
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the disclosure; and (3) the party or class of parties
to whom the disclosure may be made.8
– Disclosure of de-identified information.
FERPA does not require consent for the disclo-
sure of de-identified information from which all PII
has been removed,9 “provided that the educational
agency or institution or other party has made a rea-
sonable determination that a student’s identity is
not personally identifiable, whether through single
or multiple releases, and taking into account other
reasonably available information.”10
– Disclosure of directory information. FERPA
does not require consent prior to the disclosure of
directory information,11 as long as the educational
agency or institution has (1) given parents and stu-
dents public notice of the types of PII that the
agency has designated as directory information and
(2) given the parent or eligible student the oppor-
tunity to opt out of the disclosure or publication of
their directory information.12
– Disclosure for audit or evaluation. Consent is
not required if the disclosure is to the Comptroller
General of the United States, the Attorney General
of the United States, the Secretary, or state and
local educational authorities for audit or evaluation
purposes.13
– Disclosure for studies. Consent is also not re-
quired if the disclosure is to organizations conduct-
ing studies for or on behalf of educational agencies
or institutions to: develop, validate, or administer
predictive tests; administer student aid programs;
or improve instruction.14
– Disclosure to school officials. PII may be dis-
closed to school officials with a legitimate educa-
tional interest in the records. A third party may
be considered a school official if the party (1) per-
8 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a), (b).
9 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b).
10 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b)(1).
11 Directory information is information from student records
that can be released to the public because it would not gener-
ally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed
(34 C.F.R. § 99.3). Directory information includes information
generally considered to be directly identifying, such as names,
addresses, telephone numbers, and photographs, as well as infor-
mation that may be indirectly identifying, including dates and
places of birth, major fields of study, and honors and awards.
12 34 C.F.R. § 99.37(a).
13 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(3).
14 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(6)(i).
forms an institutional function for which the agency
or institution would otherwise use employees; (2) is
under the direct control of the agency or institution
with respect to the use and maintenance of educa-
tion records; and (3) is subject to FERPA’s require-
ments governing the use and redisclosure of PII from
education records.15 In particular, de-identification
may be outsourced to a vendor serving as a school
official in accordance with these requirements.16
Each of the relevant provisions of FERPA carries
conditions that are formalized using the expert cod-
ing process detailed in Section 4.3 above. Further, in
Section 5.3, we discuss how these requirements are for-
malized as specific license terms to be incorporated in
custom data sharing licenses.
In the following sections, we discuss two aspects
of this expert coding process, describing how we re-
lied on the legal memorandum to draft sample domain-
specific rules (Section 5.2) and sample license terms
(Section 5.3) through a series of examples.
5.2 Drafting Domain-Specific Rules
A selection of formal logic rules encoding FERPA legal
requirements is illustrated in Figure 6.17 In the remain-
der of this section we illustrate the process we used to
create these rules.
We first engaged a small team of law students, su-
pervised by a qualified lawyer to identify the documents
most relevant to understanding FERPA legal require-
ments. These documents include the enabling sections
of the United States code, section 34.99 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, and critical guidance issued by
the Department of Education’s Privacy Technical As-
sistance Center. Based on these documents, the legal
team created a memorandum that described the legal
restrictions that FERPA places on depositing, accept-
ing, retaining, and disseminating data.
This memo characterized a number of proper-
ties that are critical to determining whether deposit
of data (etc.) is permitted or denied under FERPA.
Each of these properties is then encoded in the the
15 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B).
16 See 73 Fed. Reg. 74806, 74834 (Dec. 9, 2008).
17 The full set of rules is available in our replication appendix
online. Each rule is accompanied by a human-readable rationale,
extracted from the legal memo, and by citations to the relevant
legal documentation.
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logic program for the FERPA domain. For example,
the property of a dataset DS containing identifiable
data under FERPA standards is encoded as the pred-
icate ferpa_identifiable(DS). Other properties such
as data collected with prior consent for release and data
being received under the FERPA studies exception, are
similarly encoded.
Once key properties have been encoded, the team
characterizes the constraints described in the memo by
referring to the relevant action, properties, and license
conditions (if any). For example, Figure 3 shows a rule
(discussed in Section 3.2) that encodes the permitted
release of a dataset under either the audit exception or
the studies exception.
5.3 Drafting Relevant License Terms
The legal restrictions identified in the legal memoranda
are encoded in modular license terms that are incorpo-
rated in the custom data sharing licenses produced by
the system’s automated license generator.
Separate license templates are associated with the
deposit, accept and release actions. And the terms in-
cluded in these templates are designed to be agreed to
by separate actors: the depositor, repository, or data re-
cipient actor (respectively). These agreements are gen-
erally asynchronous, and may be presented in different
forms. For example, a repository may choose to include
terms it satisfies as part of its website terms of service,
rather than presenting them at each acceptance.
Consider, for example, a data release under the
studies exception to FERPA: an educational agency or
institution may disclose PII, without consent, to orga-
nizations conducting studies for or on behalf of educa-
tional agencies or institutions to: develop, validate, or
administer predictive tests; administer student aid pro-
grams; or improve instruction.18
This restriction on the use of PII is encoded as the
following sample license term to be included in data
sharing licenses for sharing data in accordance with the
studies exception to FERPA:
Personally identifiable information (FERPA) may
only be used to conduct a study for, or on behalf
of, the educational agency or institution that
originally maintained the information. The study
18 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(6)(i).
must be for the purpose of developing, validating,
or administering predictive tests; administering
student aid programs; or improving instruction.
In addition, to fall within the scope of the studies
exception, an educational agency or institution must en-
ter into a written agreement with the recipient of the
data. FERPA requires that this written agreement (1)
specify the scope and purpose of the study as well as
the information to be disclosed; (2) require the organi-
zation to limit the use of the PII to the purposes in the
agreement; (3) ensure that the study must be performed
in a way that does not allow personal identification of
parents and students to anyone other that representa-
tions of the organization that have legitimate interests
in the information; (4) require all PII to be destroyed
when it is no longer needed and specify the time period
in which it must be destroyed.19
Based on the legal memorandum relying on the text
of the regulations as well as subsequent guidance from
the Department of Education,20 we encoded these re-
quirements for written agreements into the following
sample license terms. The first four license terms encode
the first requirement for written agreements, and the
last license term encodes the remaining requirements.
The Data Recipient agrees to use the data only for
the purpose of conducting a study to
[dataUser:supplied:FERPA:studyPurpose].
The Data Recipient agrees to use the data only
during the period of
[dataUser:supplied:FERPA:studyStartDate]
through
[dataUser:supplied:FERPA:studyEndDate].
The Data Recipient agrees to use the data only for
studies on the following topics:
[dataUser:supplied:FERPA:studyTopics].
19 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(6)(iii)(C).
20 U.S. Department of Education, The Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act: Guidance for Reasonable Methods and
Written Agreements (August 2015).
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The information disclosed is as follows:
[dataOwner:supplied:dataDescription].
The Data Recipient will:
(1) limit access to personally identifiable
information in the Data to individuals with
legitimate interests,
(2) conduct the study in a manner that does not
permit the personal identification of parents and
students by anyone other than representatives of
the Data Recipient with legitimate interests, and
(3) take steps to maintain the confidentiality of
the personally identifiable information in the Data
at all stages of the study, including within the
final report, by using appropriate disclosure
avoidance techniques.
Finally, each term is assigned a category tag (and
optional grouping id) to indicate where it should
be included in the license template corresponding to
that action (e.g. deposit, release, acceptance). For
example, the first text above is categorized as a
“TERMS:PERMITTED USES”, and would be inserted
(with other terms in the same category) in the following
portion of the release license template.
Permitted uses.
Data Recipient is granted a nonexclusive,
revocable license, to have and use the Data
provided the Data Recipient, shall comply with all
of the terms and conditions of this License.
[TERMS:PERMITTED USES]
6 Combining and Customizing
Domains
Our system is designed to be modular, allowing the com-
position of domains (i.e., of different legislation, regula-
tions, best practices, local policies, etc.). A data reposi-
tory may choose to compose modules for legislation rel-
evant to the geographic location and focus area of the
repository, as well as policies for the institution. For ex-
ample, a data repository at Harvard University may use
modules related to Massachusetts and US privacy legis-
lation, as well as a module that captures Harvard’s data
handling requirements. We briefly describe what consti-
tutes a domain module and how they can be composed.
A module includes: logic programming rules defin-
ing the conditions under which actions are permit-
ted or denied; interview questions (and how they re-
late to facts about data sets); and license terms. For
domain D, the logic programming rules define predi-
cate inScope(D, A) that indicates whether action A
is in the scope of domain D. For example, whether
inScope(ferpa, A) holds will depend on whether the
dataset associated with action A contains any informa-
tion derived from records maintained by an educational
agency or institution, etc. A given action may be in the
scope of multiple domains, and each domain may indi-
cate whether it permits or denies the action. A reason-
able way to compose permissions would be for a reposi-
tory to permit action A only if all domains for which the
action is in scope permit it, and to deny the action if
there is at least one domain for which A is in scope that
denies the action. However, repositories are free to com-
pose permissions however they choose. In particular, a
repository must decide how to handle actions which are
not in the scope of any domain, or if there is a domain for
which the action is in scope but is neither permitted nor
denied. We show an example of a top-level module that
composes other modules in the Appendix (Figure 7).
License terms and interview questions have unique
identifiers, and a module may refer to license terms and
questions from another module. Similarly, a module may
refer to predicates defined by another module. We do
not currently have a mechanism for a module to mod-
ify the license terms, interview questions, or logic rules
defined by another module.
A repository may also want to add rules that indi-
cate acceptability of tools for transformations (see Sec-
tion 3.3), as this is likely driven by local institutional
policy than legal formalization.
7 Extensions and Applications
The tool we describe is in a functional prototype stage.
It is publicly available.21 We have not yet settled on a
standardized format for a module’s interview questions,
but have implemented a questionnaire for FERPA and
Massachusetts privacy law, as well as logic programming
21 https://github.com/MIT-Informatics/LegalTags
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rules and license terms for these two domains. The logic
programming rules model permissions for deposit, ac-
ceptance, and release actions (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) and
some transformations (3.3). We have an expert-system
tool that allows exploring the implications of the logic
programming model and a tool for automated license
generation (Section 3.5), both implemented in Java. We
have not implemented a taxonomic approach for pur-
pose specification (Section 3.4). In this section we dis-
cuss potential extensions and applications.
7.1 Deployment
The prototype framework can be used to generate com-
plete licenses, and to evaluate specific decisions. How-
ever the software framework is not tested for opera-
tion in a production environment, nor provides a user-
friendly interface. A potential avenue for deployment is
integration with the Policy Models online interviewing
system [5] and the Dataverse repository [19]. Using this
approach, our system would generate and/or validate
interview instruments that would be deployed with the
Policy Models server; interview results would be used
by our system to generate licenses which would then be
transmitted to and stored in the Dataverse repository.
7.2 Local Review of Modules
Before any module is used, repository owners may wish
to have local legal experts review the module rules. We
aim to facilitate this in future by providing a prepared
corpus of fact-patterns, and corresponding licenses re-
sulting from these, in addition to the annotated decision
rules and terms. This corpus, and external expert eval-
uations of it, will be available for inspection by users of
the system and will aid local review.
7.3 Adding Domains of Law and Practice
The modular design of the system enables it to be read-
ily extended to new domains, without any changes to
the software or design of the system. Each domain is
encoded in a separate module, containing inputs, rules
and conditions. We are currently developing modules for
data protected by HIPAA, the Common Rule, and Mas-
sachusetts privacy law. Modules for other laws and best
practices may be created, disseminated, and deployed,
independently of our framework.
7.4 Adding Transformation and Purpose
Restrictions
As described above, the system is capable of reasoning
over the deposit and release of data that has under-
gone a protective transformation, such as Differential
Privacy, or which is subject to purpose restrictions, such
as consented uses. Many purposes and transformation
are applicable across multiple domains. A useful exten-
sion of the legal analysis would be to create detailed
rules across a set of common transformations (including
encryption, deidentification, and k-anonymity) and a
range of standardized purposes (e.g. “non-commercial”,
“statistical”).
7.5 Towards a Privacy Commons License
As modules are added, the complexity of the interviews
and licenses generated increase because each domain
may require its own set of affirmations and terms. Dif-
ference in terminology used to express similar concepts
across multiple domains can lead to interviews that are
unnecessarily long.
To avoid this tiresome user burden, common termi-
nology could be developed that applies to multiple do-
mains, and independent modules could encode the best
practices for applying this “privacy commons”.
While the legal analysis required to develop a full
set of commons licenses is substantial, the formaliza-
tion for applying common terms is simple. A module
can express common terms by creating a rule that as-
serts that affirming Common Term X satisfies some do-
main specific property, as discussed in the Combining
Modules section. Common rules can be introduced and
reviewed incrementally—and legal use cases tested em-
pirically using the system to evaluate whether they can
be satisfied solely by common terms.
8 Related Work
Logic and logic programs have long been used to for-
malize legislation. An early example is a Prolog formal-
ization of the British Nationality Act in the 1980s [30].
Leith [20] critiques such attempts, arguing that the
idea of a “clear rule of law” is invalid and due to factors
outside the legislation—including the legal process—it
is not possible provide legal expert systems that can pre-
dict “real judicial outcomes.” We agree that it is futile
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to attempt to fully formalize legislation in the hope of
replacing lawyers and the judiciary with a computer sys-
tem, and instead aim to formalize a very narrow aspect
of privacy-relevant legislation and best practice: provid-
ing guidance for how a data repository should decide to
accept and share data sets.
Indeed, our narrow focus allows us to use a straight-
forward logic (i.e., the fragment expressible in Prolog) to
express the privacy-relevant requirements. By contrast,
a relatively large body of work uses more sophisticated
logics to express more aspects of privacy legislation.
Barth et al. [6, 7] use an alternating-time tempo-
ral logic to express privacy and utility goals. Privacy
is expressed as linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas,
and utility requirements are expressed as agents having
appropriate strategies to accomplish certain outcomes.
They show that relevant questions of privacy policies
(e.g., policy consistency, compliance, composition, and
refinement) reduce to well-studied LTL problems. Later
work [9] extends some of the notions of compliance to a
more expressive logic.
DeYoung et al. [16] extend the work of Barth et al.
to formalize portions of HIPAA and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA) that are relevant to the transmission
of information. To do so, the propose a custom logic
PrivacyLFP, a least fixed point logic with a trace-based
semantic model, which allows PrivacyLFP to express
temporal properties. They require the power of a fixed
point logic because the legislation is self-referential.
Aucher et al. [3] take a different approach to a logi-
cal formalization of privacy, using an epistemic deontic
dynamic logic. That is, their logic reasons about knowl-
edge of agents, obligations on who knows what, and ac-
counts for updates of knowledge due to actions, such as
transmitting information.
The scope of the work of DeYoung et al. and Aucher
et al. is much greater than our framework, which focuses
on deciding whether a data repository should perform
certain limited actions. As such, we are able to use a
much simpler logic in our formalization.
Datta et al. [15] present a formal framework to char-
acterize the correctness of auditing of privacy policies
(expressed with PrivacyLFP). Chowdhury et al. [10]
considering the runtime monitoring of temporal logic
policies, using privacy policies as case studies. We do
not focus on monitoring or auditing policy compliance.
Backes et al. [4] present a framework for reason-
ing about privacy case law. The framework takes into
account precedence and court hierarchy, and facilitates
reasoning about which court precedents apply to a par-
ticular case. In our work, we are not concerned with
reasoning directly about case law and precedence, but
rather focus on encoding current practices and under-
standing in our formalization of the conditions under
which actions are permitted or defined by legislation.
Massey et al. [21, 22] consider extracting software
engineering requirements from legislation and regula-
tions. They determine that typical graduate-level soft-
ware engineering students can not write legally compli-
ant software with any confidence and develop a taxon-
omy of ambiguities that might complicate the extraction
of requirements. The taxonomy does not aim to provide
a methodology for formalization or automated reason-
ing about legislation or regulations.
Other frameworks focus on the enforcement of pri-
vacy policies in systems. Sen et al. [29] develop a frame-
work that allows the specification of privacy policies (in
terms of restrictions on user data) and the enforcement
of these policies in Map-Reduce-like big-data settings.
9 Summary
Describing existing law using formal logic is challenging.
We address this challenge by limiting the domain of ac-
tion in two ways (1) we focus on a specific domain of
use cases, actors and actions – the data repository; (2)
and focus on subset of conditions that can be automat-
ically permitted or denied – while explicitly supporting
the possibility of escalation to “human” computation in
cases that are not potentially allowable but cannot be
determined automatically.
We have developed a prototype system that is ca-
pable of automating most repository decisions con-
trolled by FERPA, and of generating appropriate li-
censes where use is permitted. This system can be ex-
tended to other laws and practices, and to reason over
data protections such as differential privacy.
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(a) Sample interview question:
Do the data contain any information derived from
records maintained by an educational agency or insti-
tution, or by a person or entity acting for the agency
or institution, that receives funds from the US De-
partment of Education?
Terms
Educational agency or institution
An educational agency or institution is a public or pri-
vate agency or institution that provides educational
services or instruction, or both, to students. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, a primary or secondary
school, college or university, school district, or state
department of education.
Funds from the US Department of Education
This means funds provided for any purpose, research
or otherwise, by the US Department of Education
to the educational agency or institution. It includes
funds provided by grant, cooperative agreement, con-
tract, subgrant, or subcontract; or funds provided
to students attending the agency or institution. The
funds may be paid to the institution by those students
for educational purposes, such as under the Pell Grant
Program and the Guaranteed Student Loan Program.
This includes all public schools and a majority of pri-
vate institutions, though most private and parochial
schools at the elementary and secondary levels do not
receive such funding.
(b) Corresponding language from the regulations:
(a) Except as otherwise noted in § 99.10, this part ap-
plies to an educational agency or institution to which
funds have been made available under any program
administered by the Secretary, if-
(1) The educational institution provides educa-
tional services or instruction, or both, to students;
or
(2) The educational agency is authorized to di-
rect and control public elementary or secondary,
or postsecondary educational institutions.
(b) This part does not apply to an educational agency
or institution solely because students attending that
agency or institution receive nonmonetary benefits
under a program referenced in paragraph (a) of this
section, if no funds under that program are made
available to the agency or institution.
(c) The Secretary considers funds to be made avail-
able to an educational agency or institution if funds
under one or more of the programs referenced in para-
graph (a) of this section-
(1) Are provided to the agency or institution by
grant, cooperative agreement, contract, subgrant,
or subcontract; or
(2) Are provided to students attending the agency
or institution and the funds may be paid to the
agency or institution by those students for edu-
cational purposes, such as under the Pell Grant
Program and the Guaranteed Student Loan Pro-
gram (Titles IV-A-l and IV-B, respectively, of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended).
(d) If an educational agency or institution receives
funds under one or more of the programs covered by
this section, the regulations in this part apply to the
recipient as a whole, including each of its components
(such as a department within a university).
Fig. 5. Sample interview question for FERPA and corresponding language from the regulations (34 C.F.R. § 99.1).
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permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU , _DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
\+( ferpa_identifiable(DS)).
permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU , _DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
ferpa_identifiable(DS),
(ferpa_studiesException(DS); ferpa_auditException(DS)),
(ferpa_license_studiesException(CS);
ferpa_license_auditException(CS)).
permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU , _DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
ferpa_identifiable(DS),
ferpa_allConsented(DS),
ferpa_license_IRB(CS).
permitted(ferpa , release(_R, DS, _DU , _DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
derivedFrom(DS, _, differentialPrivacy(Params)),
member ([ totalBudget , EPS], Params),
ferpaSufficientEps(FE),
EPS <= FE.
denied(ferpa , release(_R , DS , _DU , _DD , CS), N) :-
bounded(CS , N),
ferpa_datasetInScope(DS),
ferpa_identifiable(DS),
\+( ferpa_allConsented(DS)),
\+( ferpa_studiesException(DS)),
\+( ferpa_auditException(DS)).
ferpa_license_studiesException(CS) :-
conditionsRequire(CS, ferpa_license_notice),
conditionsRequire(CS, ferpa_license_purpose),
conditionsRequire(CS, ferpa_license_scope),
conditionsRequire(CS, ferpa_license_duration),
conditionsRequire(CS, ferpa_license_information),
conditionsRequire(CS, general_license_researchProposal),
conditionsRequire(CS, general_license_minimumPersonnel),
conditionsRequire(CS, general_license_minimumInformation),
conditionsRequire(CS, general_license_dataDestruction ).
Fig. 6. Sample rules for FERPA.
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%% In this example top -level module , the policy is to comply with
%% the FERPA and Massachusetts privacy law (CMR) formalizations.
%% An action A is permitted by University X if every law that
%% is in scope permits it, and is denied by University X if it
%% is denied by either FERPA or CMR.
permitted(universityX , A, N) :-
(permitted(ferpa , A, N); \+ inScope(ferpa , A)),
(permitted(cmr , A, N); \+ inScope(cmr , A)).
denied(universityX , A, N) :-
denied(ferpa , A, N); denied(cmr , A, N).
%% For the purposes of this example module , we will regard every
%% action as being in scope. This means that there are actions that
%% University X regards as in scope , but does not either permit nor
%% deny. Depending on the University X’s policy , we may want to
%% deny any action that is not explicitly permitted.
inScope(universityX , A).
%% Set the level of Sufficient budget for release under FERPA.
%% See the FERPA formalization.
ferpaSufficientEpsBudget (0.1).
%% Indicate that the PSI tool is a differentially private tool ,
%% i.e., if we use the PSI tool to derive DS from DS2 , then
%% we regard the deriviation as being differentially private.
derivedFrom(DS, DS2 , differentialPrivacy(Params)),
derivedFrom(DS, DS2 , psiTool(Params)),
Fig. 7. Example logic program for a top-level module that composes other modules and expresses local decisions about, e.g., which
tools are differentially private.
